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INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution,1
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment,2 protects a person's right to the free exercise of
religion. This protection, however, fails to provide a framework
with which to reconcile the freedom of religious conduct with the
need for government to regulate conduct. All three branches of
government, as created in the Constitution, create and refine this
framework.3 Traditionally, the judiciary has been the final
interpreter of the Constitution and, in this capacity, has defined
the powers of the other branches of government.4 For example,
the Supreme Court has interpreted Congress's enforcement
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to be a
remedial one,5 but at the same time broadened its scope to the
degree that Congress could justify stepping into a judicial role for
the sake of religious freedom.'
To that end, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") 7 in order to codify a strict
scrutiny test for free exercise cases.' RFRA represents Congress's
response to the Court's decision in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,' in which
the Court concluded that the First Amendment did not relieve
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ").
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. . . ."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (asserting that the

fundamental concept of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces
the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment).
3.

See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151-62 (Thomas

Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing Co. 1949) (1748) (maintaining, based upon
observations of English government, that liberty cannot exist without the separation
of all three branches of government).
4. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (establishing
the doctrine of judicial review, which gives the Supreme Court the exclusive power
to interpret the Constitution and declare invalid any laws in contradiction to it).
5. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966) (rejecting
the argument that this remedial power rests solely with the courts).
6. Cf Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (holding that Congress
did not exceed its legislative powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when
it enacted § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997), Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that Morgan "could
be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that
expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 2168.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
8. See id. § 2000bb(b)(1) (listing, as a purpose of the statute, the "restor[ation
ofil the compelling interest test" in free exercise cases).
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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individuals from complying with neutral and generally applicable
laws that, in effect, infringed upon religious practices." In its
1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores," the Court responded to
the passage of RFRA and addressed whether Congress has an
affirmative power to preserve the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.'2 The Court confronted Congress, fighting back with
one of the cornerstone principles of Marbury v. Madison,'3 that
"[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."" The Court concluded that
RFRA was unconstitutional because Congress's enforcement
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is solely
remedial.'
This decision, though resounding with free exercise
overtones, had significant implications for both the separation of
powers between the legislative and judicial branches and
federalism. Although some of the Justices did not deny the need
to look more closely into guaranteeing the protection of
individual rights,16 Flores stands for the protection of something
more important: the preservation of a federalist, democratic
society sustained by the three pillars of government, with each
branch sharing in a balanced distribution of power so that
citizens can coexist in a workable exchange of guarantees.
This Note contends that Flores has significant implications
for the future balance of power between the judiciary and
legislative branches, as well as for the future of free exercise of
religion. First, it discusses the history of the Court's decisions on
the right to free exercise, culminating in its decision in Smith as
the catalyst that encouraged Congress to enact RFRA.' 7 A closer
look into Smith will shed light on the future of free exercise.
Moreover, a historical look into the judicial treatment of

10. See id at 890 (holding that Oregon may deny unemployment compensation
when the claimant's dismissal results from drug use, even though the drug may
have been used for religious purposes); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(aUt4) (mentioning
Smith specifically).
11. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
12. See id. at 2160.
13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14. Id-at 177.
15. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164 (clarifying that Congress only has the power
to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the power to
determine what constitutes a violation).
16. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that Smith was
wrongly decided and members of Congress had "legitimate concerns"); id. at 2186
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the parties should brief the issue of whether
the Court correctly decided Smith).
17. Refer to Part IIIA infra.
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legislative enforcement power will also explain how Congress
gathered the ammunition to pass such a law.'8
Part II provides a summary of the facts and opinions that
comprise Flores. Part III analyzes the history of both the Free
Exercise Clause and Congress's enforcement power-two subjects
that set the stage for, and independently animated the opinions
in Flores. It also discusses the Court's assertion of its role as the
final interpreter of the Constitution and its need to define the
boundaries of congressional remedial power. Finally, Part III
explains the significance of Flores as to the separation of powers
and federalism doctrines. While setting limits on congressional
enforcement power, Flores also significantly affects the future of
the free exercise clause. Flores clearly reasserts that Smith is the
law on free exercise. 9 In so doing, however, it left untouched the
eventuality that the Court may need to revisit the issue in cases
of neutral, generally applicable laws."°
II. CASE RECITATION
The St. Peter Catholic Church is located in Boerne, Texasapproximately twenty-eight miles northwest of San Antonio. 1 In
1991, the Archbishop of San Antonio allowed the parishioners to
enlarge their church, which at the time could only seat about 230
people. 2 Within a few months, the Boerne City Council passed an
ordinance allowing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to
prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks
and districts.' The ordinance required that the Commission preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in
a historic district. 4 Because of the ordinance, city authorities
denied the Archbishop's application for a building permit to
enlarge the church.' The Archbishop sued the city in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas." He claimed

18. Id.
19. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (reversing the Fifth Circuit's judgment
upholding RFRA, which was the statute attempting to vitiate the Smith holding).
20. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Smith is not a
correct interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause); id. at 2186 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (expressing "serious doubts about the precedential value of the Smith
rule and its entitlement to adherence"); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
Justice O'Connor that Flores should be re-argued to re-examine Smith).
21. See id. at 2160.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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that the denial of a permit substantially burdened his
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion because the
city council did not satisfy RFRA's requirement of showing a
compelling state interest for its action.' The district court
concluded that RFRA was unconstitutional because Congress had
exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision, holding RFRA to be
constitutional.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the constitutional question at issue."
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, first looked at
RFRA and Congress's reasons for enacting it." In so doing, he
discussed Smith-a decision in which the Court had set both the
factual and legal stages for Flores. In Smith, the Court upheld an
Oregon statute that crininalized the possession of peyote,
thereby infringing upon the religious practices of Native
Americans whose use of the drug was central to those practices.'
In denying the Native American Indians an exemption to the
Oregon statute, the Smith majority disregarded the "compelling
interest" (or "strict scrutiny')
T 3 test that the Court had
established almost thirty years earlier.'
According to Justice Kennedy, the Court in Smith reasoned
that the government's ban of peyote was enforceable because it
was a neutral and generally applicable criminal law not targeted
toward any religion.' Congress responded to Smith by using its
enforcement power in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
to enact RFRA-a statute that prohibited state governments
from substantially burdening the free exercise of religion without
demonstrating a compelling state interest.' Moreover, RFRA

27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 2160-61; see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (holding that a generally applicable law, which has
the effect of infringing upon one's right of free exercise of religion, does not require a
balancing of the state's interest in passing the law with the individual's interest).
33. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) (balancing the state's
interest in denying a Seventh-Day Adventist unemployment compensation benefits
against the burden on the individual's religious beliefs).
34. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85 (declaring the Sherbert test inapplicable to
.across-the-board criminal prohibition[s] on a particular form of conduct").
35. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2160-61 (1997) (discussing
and quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 885).
36. See id. at 2161-62 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (1994)).
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required the government action at issue to be the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling interest."
The Archbishop defended RFRA by explaining that
Congress's enforcement power was not limited to remedial or
preventive legislation.3 8 Disagreeing with the Archbishop's
arguments, the Court held that Congress's enforcement power
was remedial, and that it could not decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the states .3 As the
Court explained: "Congress does not enforce a constitutional
right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power
'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation."0
In so stating, the Court discussed the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, describing one of its original purposes
as the preservation of the separation of powers between Congress
and the judiciary to prevent the centralization of power.41 The
Court noted that the perceived danger of giving Congress
primary responsibility for enforcing legal equality was that
power would be placed in the hands of changing congressional
majorities. 42 The Court explained that Congress's enforcement
power was limited to being remedial and preventive in nature.3
As an example, the Court cited the Civil Rights Cases," in which
it invalidated sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. According
to the Court, Congress was not authorized to pass "general
legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective
legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for
counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and
which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making or
enforcing... ." In addition to the Civil Rights Cases, the Court
discussed more recent cases that have emphasized the strong,
but nevertheless remedial, nature of Congress's Section Five
power,46 such as South Carolina v. Katzenbach 7 and Oregon v.
Mitchell.4 8
37. See id. at 2162 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1).
38. See id. at 2162-63 (arguing that Congress may enact legislation to prevent
constitutional violations).
39. See id. at 2164.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 2166.
42. See id. at 2165. Another argument advanced against passing the original
draft of the Fourteenth Amendment was that Congress would have the power to
legislate in areas of traditional state autonomy. See id. at 2164.
43. See id. at 2166 (citing nineteenth-century cases that established this idea).
44. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
45. Id. at 13-14.
46. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166-68 ("Any suggestion that Congress has a
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the

majority

identified several problems with RFRA. First, it was not designed
to identify and counteract laws likely to be unconstitutional for
their treatment of religion.49 Instead, the Act curtailed the states'
traditional authority to regulate the health and welfare of its
citizens." Second, RFRA's "substantial burden test" did not meet
its stated purpose of illuminating the discriminatory effects of a
law.5 A neutral and generally applicable law that burdens a
large class of citizens does not automatically imply that it
burdens a specific religious belief any differently than another. 2
By requiring the "least restrictive means" of imposing such a
burden on religion, the Court argued, RFRA became more than
just a remedial or preventive measure.' The Court was also wary
that Congress had imposed RFRA on every level of federal and
state government-a feature the Court described as "[siweeping
coverage."'
This sweeping coverage indicated that the reach and scope of
RFRA was larger than other measures passed under Congress's
enforcement power because the Act lacked restrictions.' For
instance, Congress did not include any mechanism to terminate
the Act.5" As a result, under RFRA, an individual who claimed a
substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion could
challenge any law at any time.57
The Court stated that Congress could use its enforcement
power as a remedial or preventive measure when there was "a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.' It

substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported
by our case law.").
47. 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (upholding various provisions of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 because they were remedies for voting discrimination).
48. 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (Black, J.) (upholding a five-year national ban on
literacy tests and similar requirements for voter registration to prevent

discrimination).
49. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
50. See id. (characterizing the intrusion as "considerable").
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id (noting that RFRA's "least restrictive means" requirement was not a
part of free exercise jurisprudence before Smith).
54. See id at 2170 (suggesting that remedial legislation would be more
confined).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 2164.
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continued to explain that "[1]acking such a connection, legislation
may become substantive in operation and effect." 9
The dissenting opinions of Justice O'Connor and Justice
Breyer disagreed with the majority's use of Smith as the
precedent against which it should measure the constitutionality
of RFRA." They emphasized the need to protect the free exercise
of religion and questioned whether Smith represented the best
way to ensure its protection.61 For purposes of preserving the
right to free exercise of religion, they opined that a compelling
state interest test would be appropriate to justify any
government law that infringed upon religious conduct.62 Justice
O'Connor agreed with the majority's decision that Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress a remedial power
that it can use only if there is "congruence and proportionality"
between the injury and the means of remedying it. 3 Justice
Breyer, however, disagreed with the majority's and Justice
O'Connor's discussion of the scope of Congress's enforcement
power.In his dissent, Justice Souter also disagreed with the
majority that Smith was controlling, but also disagreed with
Justice O'Connor and Breyer's rejection of Smith. 5 Justice Souter
felt that the Court should have fully examined the merits of
Smith instead of assuming it was correct.6
The concurrence of Justices Scalia and Stevens responded to
Justice O'Connor's contention that Smith was inconsistent with
precedent.67 They noted that the dissent failed to point to any
historical material inconsistent with Smith.' Justices Scalia and

59. Id.
60. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2186 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
61. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Smith
decision was incorrect and that Boerne is the proper vehicle for the Court's reexamination of Smith).
62. See id. at 2177 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that this compelling state
interest test was the standard before Smith).
63. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (declining to join in the first
paragraph of part I of Justice O'Connor's dissent, claiming this analysis to be
unnecessary).
65. See id. at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (contending that because the Court did not
re-examine Smith, Flores could not be decided soundly and, therefore, certiorari was
improvidently granted).
67. See id. at 2172 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (disagreeing with the
dissent's argument "that historical materials support a result contrary to the one
reached in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith").
68. See id. at 2172-73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (addressing Michael
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Stevens contended that the dissent's argument did not support
the conclusion that Smith failed to protect religious conduct from
neutral laws of general application because the examples the
dissent used were state actions that targeted a religion in some
specific way, rather than actions only incidentally affecting free
exercise.69 They also argued that before the enactment of the Bill
of Rights, the legislatures accommodated religious practice."°
Justices Scalia and Stevens contended that this history of
legislative accommodation suggests that the drafters of the Bill of
Rights did not believe that "accommodation was understood to be
constitutionally mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." In
other words, Justices Scalia and Stevens argued that the Bill of
Rights, as originally understood, consisted of a set of principles
that were legislatively desirable, but not constitutionally
required.7 2
The concurrence emphasized that the dissent's opinion was
attractive to the populace, but the evidence it used for its
arguments was incorrect.73 Justices Scalia and Stevens asserted:
"The historical evidence put forward by the dissent does nothing
to undermine the conclusion we reached in Smith: It shall be the
people" who will decide the outcome of neutral laws that
nevertheless burden religious practices.7' In other words, they
would defer to the state legislatures as the entities best situated
to determine the need for their own neutral laws of general
applicability, despite a possible infringement upon the practices
of some religious groups.

McConneU's suggestion that Smith is compatible with the original intent of the Free
Exercise Clause). Professor McConnell discusses the major philosophical, legal, and
historical sources for the Free Exercise Clause in The Origins and Historical
Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
69. See Fores,117 S. Ct. at 2173 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
70. See id. at 2174 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
7L Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
72. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (-here is no reason to think they
were meant to describe what was constitutionally required (and judicially
enforceable), as opposed to what was thought to be legislatively or even morally
desirable.").
73. See id. 2175-76 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (noting that abstract
arguments must be supported by cases, of which the dissent cites none, because
none exist).
74. Id. at 2176 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (explaining that the issue in
Smith was "whether the people, through their elected representatives, or rather this
Court, shall control the outcome of" cases in which a generally applicable law
burdens a particular religious practice).
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III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Background to the Free Exercise of Religion
1. No Definite Answer to Free Exercise. Two concepts
embrace freedom of religion in the First Amendment: the
freedom to believe or not to believe in a god; and the freedom to
act on that belief.7" The freedom to have certain religious beliefs
is personal and unique.76 Conduct, on the other hand, is usually
interpersonal and may infringe on the rights of others; therefore,
it is subject to government regulation in order to protect society
at large.77 Conduct and belief commonly overlap through the
performance of religious practices.78 Governments regulate
conduct in order to maintain a functional civil society.79 The
extent of governmental regulation can be difficult to measure,
however, especially when it crosses over into individual rights
such as religious freedom."
The Supreme Court's stance on the unconstitutionality of a
law that outwardly denies an individual the right to disseminate
religious beliefs is clear. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
81 the Court applied a strict scrutiny test to strike
Inc. v. Hialeah,
down a Florida ordinance that had banned the religious sacrifice
of animals." In that case, the Court ruled that the ordinance was

75. See McConnell, supra note 68, at 1488 (stating that "the term 'free exercise'
makes clear that the clause protects religiously motivated conduct as well as belief");
see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 300-03 (1940) ('Thus the [First]
Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act.").
76. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (asserting that an individual's freedom to
believe as she chooses is absolute).
77. See id. at 304 (relating that the freedom to act in this context must be
defined appropriately so as to be enforceable and still protect the public); see also
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (upholding a federal law
criminalizing bigamy despite a Mormon's claim that polygamy was his religious
duty).
78. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-167 (1878) ("Laws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief
and opinions, they may with practices."); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
220 (1972) (stating that religious "belief and action cannot be neatly confined in
logic-tight compartments").
79. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (describing religious practices, such as ritual
sacrifice and self-immolation, that the government can almost certainly regulate).
80. See McConnell, supra note 68, at 1430-35 (discussing the various
philosophies that influenced the formation of the Bill of Rights and addressed the
issue of religious beliefs conflicting with governmental policy).
81. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
82. See id. at 545-46 (explaining that non-neutral laws that burden a religious
practice "most undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny").
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facially discriminatory and targeted a specific religious group.'
Moreover, the government's objectives were not compelling
enough to allow such a burden targeted at a religious practice to
stand.'
Laws that are facially discriminatory toward the free
exercise of religion are rare.' More common are generally
applicable statutes that place some neutral impositions on
religious practices.' The Court has historically handled these
types of statutes in different ways.
Before the 1960s, for example, the Court upheld facially

neutral statutes that incidentally burdened religious conduct,87
although it seemed to require "that government pursue the least
drastic means to a compelling secular end.'s Much of the
protection of free exercise, though, coincided with the protection
of free speech.'
83. See id. at 533-35.
84. See id. at 535 (noting that the ordinances attempted a -religious
gerrymander," ie., targeting religious practices under the guise of a proper
governmental end (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring))).
85. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 157 (1997). Governmental
discrimination against religion is usually the result of mistake or incorrect
interpretation of religious jurisprudence. See id.at 157 n.23.
86. See id. at 157 (suggesting that otherwise neutral burdens on religion are
often placed on religious minorities); see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding an Oregon statute that
criminalized the use of peyote despite arguments from American Indians that such a
ban violated their freedom to use the drug for religious practices); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (upholding an Air Force regulation requiring
uniform dress that prohibited an Air Force captain from wearing a yarmulke while
on duty); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-402 (1963) (striking down South
Carolina's refusal to grant a Seventh-Day Adventist unemployment benefits for not
working on Saturdays, her religious day of rest); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
608-09 (1961) (upholding a state Sunday closing law despite complaints from
orthodox Jewish merchants that the law impaired their ability to earn a livelihood
because their religion prohibited working on Saturdays); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (using free speech arguments to protect
a group of Jehovah's Witnesses' right not to follow a regulation requiring students to
salute the flag); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (sustaining
the federal government's right to make bigamy a crime despite its imposition on the
Mormon religious practice of polygamy).
87. See, e.g., Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
88. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-13, at 1251 (2d
ed. 1988); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (requiring the
state to use "a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as
constituting a clear and present danger to ...the State").
89. See, e.g., Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634 (invalidating regulations requiring a flag
salute under free speech grounds rather than free exercise); see also Smith, 494 U.S.
at 881 (stating that prior decisions banning the application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated conduct involved the Free Exercise Clause in
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In 1963, the Court decided its landmark free exercise case,
Sherbert v. Verner.9" In Sherbert, the Court clearly established
that a state must show a compelling interest before passing a
neutral law of general application that incidentally burdened an
individual's right to free exercise.91 In Sherbert, a Seventh Day
Adventist was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays, which was
her religious day of rest.92 She filed a claim for unemployment
compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act.9" The state, however, denied her benefits
because she would not work on Saturdays.94 The Court held that
it was unconstitutional for South Carolina to apply the eligibility
provisions of its unemployment compensation act if doing so
would force a worker to abandon his or her religious practices of
respecting "the day of rest."95 Sherbert is a good example of the
Court's attempt to address the common constitutional problem
that generally applicable laws create when, though not
intentionally targeted toward any particular religious practice,
they conflict with such practices. The case established a strict
scrutiny test against which to measure the constitutionality of
state actions that incidentally burden a person's religious
practices, even if the action did not purport to prohibit any
specific religious conduct.9"
The Court reasoned that the government's denial of
compensation forced the appellant "to choose between following
conjunction with other constitutional protections, including the Freedom of Speech
Clause). But see id. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (responding to the majority's
attempt to distinguish prior Court decisions that banned neutral and generally
applicable laws on free speech grounds by arguing that those "hybrid" decisions
expressly relied upon the Free Exercise Clause and are part of "the mainstream of
our free exercise jurisprudence").
90. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
91. See id. at 403 (stating that the South Carolina's Supreme Court decision
may be upheld if "any incidental burden on the free exercise of... religion may be
justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
State's constitutional power to regulate (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963))).
92. See id. at 399.
93. See id. at 399-400 (explaining that the plaintiff was unable to obtain other
employment because she would not take Saturday work).
94. See id. at 401 (quoting the South Carolina law which provided that a
claimant was ineligible for benefits "[ilf... he has failed, without good cause.., to
accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the
employer. . . .'" (alterations in original)).
95. See id. at 410 (noting that the holding does not apply to a state's adoption
of a given method of unemployment compensation).
96. See id. at 403 (stating that "any incidental burden on the free exercise of
appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest" (quoting Button,
371 U.S. at 438)); id. at 406 (holding that it is insufficient merely to show "a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest").
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the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
to accept work, on the other hand."97 According to the Court, the
state action's specific discriminatory effect on Saturday
Sabbatarians
only compounded
its unconstitutionality."s
Furthermore, the Court noted that the state failed to offer an
overriding, compelling state interest that justified the state's
denial of unemployment benefits." The state's interest to prevent
the filing of fraudulent claims feigning religious objections to
Saturday work was not sufficiently compelling. ' For the Court to
uphold such a statute, the state needed to show that "no
alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses
without infringing First Amendment rights." ' In other words,
the state failed to prove that an exemption for the Saturday
Sabbatarians, which would have allowed them unemployment
benefits, 10 2would impair the furtherance of a compelling state
interest.
Sherbert not only established a strict scrutiny test for free
exercise cases, but it also expanded the meaning of "compelling"
to include the lack of feasible exemptions to the state action."°
Accordingly, the state interest is compelling only if no feasible
exemptions to a state law can exist without impairing the state's
interest.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"' the Court reaffirmed Sherbert.'" It
decided that an exemption for fourteen- and fifteen-year old
Amish students from attending school until the age of sixteen
97. Id. at 404.
98. See id at 406 (noting that the South Carolina law does not require Sunday
worshippers to choose between work or religion although it requires Saturday
Sabbatarians to do so).
99. See id. at 406-07.
100. See id. at 407 (refusing to scrutinize the interest in preventing fraudulent
claims because it was not argued before the state supreme court).
101. Id
102. See McConnell, supra note 68, at 1412 (quoting Justice Harlan's dissent in
Sherbert to demonstrate that a state must carve out an exception for claimants
whose unavailability is due to their religious convictions).
103. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07 (stating that the government bears the
burden of demonstrating that no alternative, less-restrictive forms of regulation
would combat spurious claims which threaten to dilute the unemployment
compensation fund); cf Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (upholding the
application of the state Sunday closing law to orthodox Jewish merchants, who
argued that such a law impaired their ability to earn a livelihood, because granting
an exemption would have undermined the state's secular purpose of assuring a
uniform day of rest).
104. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
105. See id. at 215 (citing Sherbert for the proposition that a state's interest in
compulsory education is not absolute).
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would not impair the state's interest in educating its citizens to
be "self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.""' The
Court concluded that the tradition of education within the Amish
religion sufficiently satisfied Wisconsin's interest in maintaining
educated and functional citizens.' Therefore, providing an
exemption to compulsory education until the age of sixteen for
Amish children would not inhibit the state's compelling
interest. Once again, the Court emphasized that a government
regulation that appears "neutral" on its face may be
unconstitutional if, in its general application, it nevertheless
unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."9
A state's failure to provide an exemption from regulations
burdening a religious belief, however, will not automatically
invalidate those regulations. In United States v. Lee, 1 ' the Court
upheld the federal government's refusal to allow an exemption to
Amish employers who sought to avoid paying social security
taxes on religious grounds."' The Court reasoned that such an
exemption would have significantly impaired the government's
objective to maintain a funded social security system because
mandatory participation was necessary to achieve that
objective.1 In this case, therefore, the lack of a feasible
exemption to the payment of social security13 taxes made the
government's objective even more "compelling."
After Sherbert, the Court implemented a strict scrutiny test
that turned on the feasibility of an exemption to the regulation
that interfered with religious practices."' This heightened scrutiny
resulted in stricter limitations upon state regulations in general
and, in particular, on neutral laws of general application that had
only an "incidental effect" upon the free exercise of any religion."
106. Id. at 221.
107. See id. at 225 (noting the difference between compulsory education as
preparation for a child's entry into modern society and the preparation for life in a
segregated Amish farming community).
108. See id. at 235-36 (explaining that there is a minimal difference between
what the state would require and what the Amish already accepted).
109. See id. at 220.
110. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
111. See id. at 254.
112. See id. at 258-59 (noting that voluntary participation in funding social
security would be virtually impossible to oversee).
113. See id. (reasoning that the nationwide aspect of social security highlights
the government's interest, and that the necessity of mandatory participation makes
that interest "very high").
114. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). For a discussion of cases
in which the Court found exemptions compatible with a state's compelling interest,
thereby protecting the right to free exercise, see TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1254-62.
115. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972) (allowing an
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2. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith. The Supreme Court Closes the Door on Strict
Scrutiny. In 1990, the Supreme Court changed its position
regarding the effect that neutral laws of general application may
have on the free exercise of religion. A private drug rehabilitation
organization fired the respondents in Smith because they
consumed peyote as a part of the religious ceremony of their
Native American religion.116 The State of Oregon denied them
unemployment compensation benefits because of a criminal
statute that disqualified employees
from benefits for
"misconduct" related to their work.1 7 The Court upheld the
Oregon law that prohibited peyote use"' and also supported
Oregon's refusal to create an exemption for American Indians
who used the drug as part of their religious rites."' Smith
reestablished the traditional, pre-1960s position that "a general
law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs"
does not violate the right to free exercise of religion." The Court
emphasized the government's duty to regulate conduct in order to
preserve, above all, the integrity of a law-abiding society.
Quoting Reynolds v. United States,1 21 the Court asked: "Can a
man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious
belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." "
In Smith, the Court confined the scope of Sherbert to laws
concerning unemployment compensation benefits.' Moreover,
exemption for Amish children to state compulsory education laws because the
exemption would not prevent the state from furthering its compelling interest of
educating the populace); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09 (finding that the denial of
unemployment benefits to Saturday Sabbatarians for not working on Saturdays did
not meet a demonstrable, compelling state interest).
116. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
874 (1990).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 885 ("The government's ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of
public policy, 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a
religious objector's spiritual development.'" (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988))).
119. See id. at 890 (explaining that permitting a nondiscriminatory religious
practice exemption does not mean that it is constitutionally required).
120. Id. at 879-81 (quoting Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, 594 (1940)).
121. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
122. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67).
123. See id. at 883 (stating that the Supreme Court has "never invalidated any
governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of
unemployment compensation").

660

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[36:645

the Court replaced the Sherbert strict scrutiny test with a lower
standard, holding, "if prohibiting the exercise of religion... is
not the object... but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment
has not been offended." 124
As a result of Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws
would be insulated from constitutional review. 125 Therefore, it
became more difficult for religious groups, especially religious
minority groups, to prove the unconstitutionality of a generally
applicable12 6government statute that infringed on their religious
practices.

3. Justice O'Connor Leaves the Back Door Open for the
Future of Religious Freedom. In her concurrence in Smith,
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's result, 127 but argued
for a case-by-case determination of whether a government's
criminal laws serve a compelling interest and whether the laws
impose an unconstitutional burden.2 Justice O'Connor was
particularly concerned with the general application of neutral
laws because they could unduly burden the free exercise of
religion 9 and "coerce a person to violate his religious conscience
or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws
aimed at religion."30 Justice O'Connor demonstrated that
applying Sherbert's compelling interest test to the facts in Smith
would lead to the same conclusion the majority reached' 31
Although Oregon's prohibition on the use of peyote placed "a
124. Id. at 878 (analogizing the applicability of a neutral law with the collection
of a general tax).
125. See McConnell, supra note 85, at 158-59 (suggesting several situations in
which discriminatory acts would be protected under Smith).
126. See id. at 159 (noting that Smith resulted in rapid and rigorous opposition
from religious and civil liberties groups).
127. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating her
agreement with the result of the majority decision but noting that the "holding
dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears
unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation's
fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty").
128. See id. at 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating a case-by-case
evaluation of the burden on the plaintiffs even if the law in question "might usually
serve a compelling interest in health, safety, or public order").
129. See id. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A regulation neutral on its face
may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for
government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." (quoting
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972))).
130. Id. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. See id. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The compelling interest test
reflects the First Amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest
extent possible in a pluralistic society.").
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severe burden on the ability of respondents to freely exercise
their religion,"132 Justice O'Connor stated that Oregon had "a
significant interest in enforcing laws that control the possession
and use of controlled substances by its citizens.""' She identified
the issue as whether an exemption from the state's general
criminal prohibition would "'unduly interfere with fulfillment of
the governmental interest.'""' 4 According to Justice O'Connor, the
state's interest in protecting society from the dangers of drug use
and drug trafficking was compelling enough to justify uniform
criminal legislation preventing peyote use.1" Justice O'Connor
concluded that, in this case, an exemption for religious use of
peyote "would seriously impair Oregon's compelling interest in
prohibiting possession of peyote by its citizens.""'
Using the Sherbert analysis, Justice O'Connor seriously
undermined the majority's opinion by demonstrating that there
was no need to change the law on free exercise of religion. Justice
O'Connor preferred the Sherbert test because it provided better
protection against future state actions, especially those involving
neutral laws of general application: "Given the range of conduct
that a State might legitimately make criminal, we cannot
assume, merely because a law carries criminal sanctions and is
generally applicable, that the First Amendment never requires
the State to grant a limited exemption for religiously motivated
conduct."'37 Much of Congress's reasoning behind the enactment
of RFRA mirrors Justice O'Connor's position in Smith."'
B. Congress'sMistaken Belief that its Enforcement Power Could
Define the Boundariesof Free Exercise
By eliminating the compelling interest standard, the Court
left room for state governments to enact generally applicable,
neutral laws with minimal deference to the incidental effects
132. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 904 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134
Id. at 905 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 259 (1982)).
135. See id. at 905 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (admitting that while "the question
is close," the state's interest in protecting its citizens from the "inherently harmful
and dangerous" effects of the possession and use of controlled substances outweighs
free exercise concerns).
136. Id. at 906 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Id. 899-900 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1892,
1897-98 (recommending the legislative adoption of the compelling interest test
because it "reflects the First Amendments mandate of preserving religious liberty to
the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society" (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 903
(O'Connor, J., concurring))).
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they may have on religious practices. 3 ' Justice O'Connor's strong
concurrence demonstrated
that there may have been no reason to
4
overturn Sherbert. 1
In effect, RFRA addresses the inconsistencies between the
majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith.
For instance, RFRA declared that Sherbert-not Smith-was the
law that best protected free exercise from generally applicable
laws. 14' By enacting RFRA, Congress revisited the Framers'
struggle to balance the need for state governance and individual
religious beliefs.' Yet in doing so, Congress also raised another
important constitutional question: Was there a separation of
powers limitation on Congress's attempt to protect substantive
rights? In Flores, the Court responded in the affirmative.
1. The Undefined, Remedial Power of Congress. Congress's
enforcement power emanates from Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which gives Congress legislative ability to ensure

that states comply with that Amendment.14 According to the
Court, this ability does not include the power to enact laws
beyond those already in the Constitution. 4 The Court has held
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress the
"power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of
state legislation."'45 Congress disregarded "the domain of state
139. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that neutral
laws "can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his
religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion"). Refer to notes 129-36
supra and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's concerns).
140. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 900-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(4),
2000bb(b)(1) (1994) (stating that Smith "virtually eliminated the requirement that
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion" and, therefore, it was necessary to restore "the compelling interest test as
set forth in [Sherbert] to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened"); see also S. REP. No. 103-111, at 4-9, reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1894-97 (explaining that pre-Smith precedent required the
government to meet the compelling interest test).
142. Refer to notes 75-80 supra and accompanying text (discussing why a
government may regulate conduct based on a religious belief but not a religious
belief itself).
143. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (allocating to Congress the "power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"); see also HERMINE
HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 158

(1977) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment "only prohibits the states from
denying certain rights [and that t]he only obligation resting upon the United States
is to see that the states do not deny such rights"). Thus, "it is necessary that, first,
there must be an action by a state in violation of the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment and, second, an act of Congress to correct such violation." Id. at 159.
144. See MEYER, supra note 143, at 158.
145. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 555 (1891).
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legislation" restriction, however, by applying RFRA "to all
Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law,
whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or
after November 16, 1993.146
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from
denying the guaranteed rights of due process and equal
protection. 47 In determining the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court has portrayed Congress as a "watchdog"
that oversees state actions: "[T]he amendment guarantees
[equality of rights among citizens], but no more. The power of the
national government is limited to the enforcement of this
guaranty.""1 Therefore, Congress possesses the power to correct
state acts that violate the Fourteenth Amendment.' However,
Congress could only remedy an already established,
inappropriate state action and could not prevent possible future
inappropriate state actions. ' According to the Court:
[U]ntil some State law has been passed, or some State
action through its officers or agents has been taken,
adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United
States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under
such legislation, can be called into activity: for the
prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws
and acts done under State authority.151
Over the years, the Court has attempted to define the extent
of Congress's remedial power.152 For instance (and by analogy),
the Court allowed Congress to exercise its remedial power in the
context of voting-rights measures adopted during the 1960s to

146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a).
147. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
148. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (ex,-plaining that the
Fourteenth Amendment grew out of the aftermath of the Civil War as a means of
ensuring that the states would not deny any citizen, regardless of their race, the
rights to due process and equal protection); see also MEYER, supra note 143, at 15859 (discussing Congress's role regarding the Fourteenth Amendment).
149. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to state action and that Congress can pass laws to prevent the
states from interfering with the due process and equal protection rights guaranteed
in the Fourteenth Amendment).
150. See id. at 13-14.
151. Id.
152. See Donald Francis Donovan, Note, Toward Limits On Congressional
Enforcement Power Under the Civil War Amendments, 34 STAN. L. REV. 453, 453-56
(1982) (tracing the development of the Court's definition of congressional
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, beginning in the 1880s with
the Civil Rights Cases, through the developments of the late 1960s with Katzenbach
v. Morgan).
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eliminate racial discrimination in voting.1"3 In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a
measure that suspended literacy and similar voter eligibility
tests for a period of five years." Although a Fifteenth
Amendment case, South Carolina v. Katzenbach has clear
implications for Congress's enforcement power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5' The Court held that
Congress could use any rational means to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment's ban on racial discrimination in voting.' In South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, there was sufficient evidence to support
a congressional finding that various states used literacy tests as
a means of racial discrimination in voting.'57 Therefore, the
Voting Rights Act was a rational remedy to the voting
discrimination which constituted a per se violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 58
Similarly, Congress could employ specific remedies if it
found sufficient evidence that states were violating rights
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 " Although the
Court expanded Congress's enforcement power to include the
power to remedy state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court had not yet determined whether Congress
could use this remedial power in areas other than racial
discrimination.

153. See id. at 455 (noting that "in enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
Congress expressly used the enforcement clause of the 15th amendment" (footnote
omitted)); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-15 (1966)
(recounting the history of racial discrimination in voting and Congress's
ineffectiveness in curtailing it).
154. See South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315.
155. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 261-62 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (analogizing Congress's specifically informed legislative competence in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach Congress's invocation of its § 5 Fourteenth
Amendment power in enacting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966) (using analysis of § 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment to uphold congressional action under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
156. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324, 326 ("Congress has full
remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial
discrimination in voting."); see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879)
(emphasizing that "Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate
legislation" and that "[slome legislation is contemplated to make the [Civil War]
amendments fully effective").
157. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328 (stating that Congress
had concluded that there was persistent voting discrimination in certain geographic
areas of the United States).
158. See id. at 331.
159. See MEYER, supra note 143, at 159.

1999]

CITY OFBOERNE V. FLORES

665

2. BroadeningCongressionalPower: Katzenbach v. Morgan
and Justice Harlan's Dissent. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,' the
Supreme Court found that Section 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act was a valid exercise of Congress's remedial power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.' This section
provided that non-English speakers who had completed the sixth
grade in an accredited Spanish-language school in Puerto Rico
could not be denied suffrage. The Court deferred to Congress's
factual conclusions," and honored its finding that the literacy
tests were in fact discriminatory. In Morgan, as in South
Carolinav. Katzenbach, the Court emphasized the importance of
Congress's superior fact-finding abilities."
The majority did not interpret this deference to Congress's
superior fact-finding ability as a grant of power to define the
substantive scope of constitutional guarantees. 6 Justice Harlan's
dissent, however, described the majority opinion as such an
interpretation." He noted that, in this case, Congress did not
make an appropriate finding of fact that discrimination was
occurring against non-English speakers."9 He maintained that
Congress simply made a legal conclusion that literacy tests for
Puerto-Rican voters constituted a violation of their equal
protection rights.'
According to Justice Harlan, Congress
assumed a judicial role by determining that a state statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause:
The question here is not whether the statute is
appropriate remedial legislation to cure an established
violation of a constitutional command, but whether there
160.
161.

384 U.S. 641 (1966).
See id. at 648 (disagreeing with the New York Attorney General's

argument that only the judiciary branch may enforce the Equal Protection Clause).
162.
163.
164.

See id. at 643.
See id. at 653.
See id.

165.

See id ("Any contrary conclusion would require us to be blind to the

realities familiar to the legislators.").
166. See id. at 656 (reserving the "question [of whether the congressional
remedies adopted in § 4(e) constitute means which are not prohibited by, but are
consistent 'with the letter and spirit of the constitution).
167. See id at 659, 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the Court has

confused... what questions are appropriate for congressional determination and
what questions are essentially judicial in nature," and advocating a clear separation
between the legislative and judicial functions).
168. See id. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (declaring that there was "no
legislative record supporting such hypothesized discrimination").
169. See id (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the congressional fact-finding
concerning literacy tests and racial discrimination as "at most.., a legislative
announcement" instead of the more appropriate "congressional estimate, based on
its determination of legislative facts").
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has in fact been an infringement of that constitutional
command, that is, whether a particular state practice or,
as here, a statute is so arbitrary or irrational as to offend
the command of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. That question is one for the

judicial branch ultimately to determine.17

The only substantive matters that the Fourteenth
Amendment may touch are those "within the primary legislative
competence of the States."17 ' Thus, "a state statute that passes
constitutional muster under the judicial standard of rationality
should not be permitted to be set at naught by a mere contrary
congressional pronouncement unsupported by a legislative record
justifying that conclusion."17 Therefore, under Justice Harlan's
view, the Fourteenth Amendment could only control state actions
that violate the rights protected by that Amendment.173
The Morgan opinions outline broad understandings of
Congress's enforcement power.'74 The majority interpreted
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as granting Congress
the power to remedy discrimination. 7 ' The dissent, on the other
hand, described the majority's interpretation as an
unconstitutional expansion of congressional power to include
defining the substantive scope of those rights within the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7 ' Due to the disparity between what the
Court said and what it claimed to have done, Morgan rendered
the scope of congressional enforcement power vague."'
C. The Supreme Court ReassertsIts Power
1. Defining CongressionalEnforcement Power: A New Test.
The broad remedial power defined in Morgan, labelled a

170. Id. at 667 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 670 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 670-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 670 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
174. See Donovan, supra note 152, at 455 (describing the Court's pronouncement
of congressional power "to enforce and perhaps even to define the 14th amendment's
guarantees" as "seductively broad").
175. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 ("Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of
legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
176. See id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that judgment and
discretion have traditionally been judicial issues, not legislative concerns).
177. See Donovan, supra note 152, at 456 (stating that although the Court
"continues to treat the enforcement power with special deference," the scope of that
power remains unclear).
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csubstantive power" in Justice Harlan's dissent, was left open to
interpretation. 8 The Court never fully resolved the question of
whether the broad remedial power it established for Congress in
Katzenbach v. Morgan could modify the substantive scope of the

rights included within the Fourteenth Amendment rights,
thereby leaving unclear the scope of congressional enforcement
power.9
The Voting Rights Amendments of 1970, which lowered the
voting age to eighteen for both state and federal elections, were
at issue in Oregon v. Mitchell."8 ' The Court sustained the sections
of the statute pertaining to federal elections, but found the
section
regulating
state
and
local elections
to
be
unconstitutional. 8' Four Justices believed that Congress could
lower the state-election voting age because of its power under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Four other Justices, including Justice
Harlan, rejected the idea that Congress had the power to lower

state or federal voting ages." Justice Harlan argued that Section
One

of the Fourteenth Amendment

did not reach voter

qualifications and that the Constitution gave the states, not the
federal
government,
the
power
to
establish
voting
qualifications.' He concluded that Congress's fact-finding ability
178. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that prior cases may be interpreted as allowing Congress some
flexibility in deciding the extent of Fourteenth Amendment protection, but stating
that Congress may not "define rights wholly independently of our case law"); Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 127-29 (1970), superseded by constitutionalamendment as
stated in National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 612 n.51 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (demonstrating Congress's power to amend the Constitution as a check on
the Court).
179. See Donovan, supra note 152, at 465 (suggesting that the Court's failure to
clarify the tests surrounding Congress's enforcement power allows abuse of that
power, as evidenced by congressional efforts to reverse the Court's abortion decision
by redefining when life" begins).
180. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Constitution,
which lowered the voting age to 18 for state and federal elections, effectively
overruled the Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell. See National Treasury
Employees Union, 492 F.2d at 612 n.51.
181. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 118 (holding that Congress may supervise and set
qualifications for voters in national elections but not for state and local elections);
see also Donovan, supra note 152, at 463 & n.61 (analyzing the Mitchell decision and
the varying opinions therein).
182. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 135 (Douglas, J.) ("The grant of the franchise to
18-year-olds by Congress is in my view valid across the board."). Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall agreed with Justice Douglas' view. See id. at 118 (Black, J.).
183. See id. at 154 (Harlan, J.) (finding "no other source of congressional power
to lower the voting age as fixed by state laws").
184. See id. at 200-01 (Harlan, J.) (arguing that the states neither surrendered
nor delegated the power to set voter qualifications to the federal government "except
to the extent that the guarantee of a republican form of government may be thought
to require a certain minimum distribution of political power" (footnote omitted)).
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was irrelevant because the voting-age issue did not revolve
around the facts. 8 ' Justice Black, whose opinion determined the
outcome of the Court's decision, argued that because Congress's
action was not relevant to racial discrimination, it did not have
the authority to lower the voting age for state elections.186 The
Fourteenth Amendment was broader in racial discrimination
cases, he argued, but regulating
voting qualifications falls within
187
the domain of the states.

The Court's decisions in Morgan and Oregon v. Mitchell, left
in their wake ambiguity regarding the extent of congressional
enforcement power. Purportedly, this ambiguity allowed
Congress to use the Morgan interpretation of its Section Five
enforcement power, a positive grant of legislative power, to enact
RFRA.'" According to the Fifth Circuit, RFRA was a proper
exercise of Congress's Section Five power as defined in Morgan.'89
The court stated that protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the right to the
free exercise of religion,190 and that RFRA was a proper remedial
use of congressional power.' Although RFRA did not address
specific state violations of guaranteed rights, it was sufficiently
remedial in that it could identify potential violations.'92 In other
185. See id. at 205-06 (Harlan, J.).
186. See id. at 130 (Black, J.) (reasoning that Congress "exceeded its powers in
attempting to lower the voting age in state and local elections" because the action
did not have a "foundation for enforcing the Civil War Amendments' ban on racial
discrimination").
187. See id. at 126 (Black, J.).
188. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-63 (1997) ("Congress
relied on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enacting the most far
reaching and substantial of RFRA's provisions, those which impose its requirements
on the States."); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (providing the oftquoted phrase that "[c]orrectly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power");
see also S. REP. No. 103-111, at 13-14 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
1903 (quoting the broad language of Morgan in the report's description of Congress's
constitutional authority to enact RFRA).
189. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that Congress was empowered to enact RFRA under the three-part test the Court
created in Morgan), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). As applied in the Fifth Circuit, the
three parts of the Morgan test include: (1) whether the legislation may be regarded
as an enactment to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) whether the legislation
is plainly adapted to enforcing the Amendment; and (3) whether the legislation "is
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution." See id. at 1358-64; see also
Arguments Before the Court: Religion, 65 U.S.L.W. 3577, 3577-78 (reporting on the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Flores v. City of Boerne).
190. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1358 (stating that the incorporation "has been long
established").
191. See id. at 1360 ("Congress considered the need for 'appropriate legislation'
to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and responded with
legislation that is 'plainly adapted' to that end.").
192. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(b)(2)
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words, RFRA would remedy "budding" constitutional violations,
such as neutral laws of general application,9 3 that the less
stringent Smith test might overlook.' The Fifth Circuit also
stated that RFRA was within the "letter and spirit" of the
Constitution and, therefore, did not violate the Separation of
Powers Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Tenth
Amendment.9
RFRA stated that:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability [unless the government]
demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.'
RFRA's restrictions applied to all statutory or any other law
adopted before or after its enactment ' 97 and to any "branch,
department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other
person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or
a subdivision of a State." 9 ' Therefore, a person claiming that the
government substantially burdened his or her free exercise of
religion would always have a claim or defense, despite a possible
Court determination that a specific law's "incidental effects" on
Congress emphasized
religious practices were constitutional.
that the compelling interest test "is a workable test for striking

(1994) (providing "a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government").
193. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1359; S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 4-5 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C-A.N. 1892, 1894 (stating that governmental rules of general
applicability may undermine the fundamental constitutional right of free exercise of
religion).
194. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1359.
195. See id. at 1361-63 (dismissing the city's claims that RFRA is inconsistent
"with the letter and spirit of the Constitution").
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a), (b).
197. See id. § 2000bb-3(a).
198. Id. § 2000bb-2(1).
199. See id § 2000bb(b)(2); see also, ag., Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (upholding an Oregon law that
prohibited ingestion of peyote without an exemption for religious practices).
Examples of cases in which the plaintiff uses RFRA to claim a free exercise violation
include EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996); and
Fawaadv. Jones, 81 F.3d 1084, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996).
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sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests."0
In passing RFRA, Congress intended to restore the
compelling interest test of Sherbert to guarantee its application
in cases of free exercise violations."' In a sense, RFRA provided
the courts with direction for deciding free exercise cases.2"' It was
Congress's attempt to solidify the standard under which a
claimant could bring a free exercise violation case under one
law.'3 By guaranteeing "a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government,"'04
RFRA attempted to ensure that even neutral laws of general
applicability would not coerce persons to abandon or change their
religious practices. Congress was particularly concerned with the
rights afforded to prisoners to practice their religions, which the
Court's decision in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz had weakened."'
Congress was also concerned with certain military regulations
that burdened religious practices. " 6 After Congress enacted
RFRA, several courts applied it, especially when prisoners' free
exercise rights were at issue.0 7 In many cases in which the courts
applied RFRA, they ruled in favor of the prisoners."8
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5).
201.
See id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
202. See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 7-8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1892, 1897 (asserting that because of the Smith decision, laws of general
applicability that burden religious practices will be analyzed under the rational
basis test, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny).
203.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (stating, as its purpose, "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder"
(citations omitted)).
204. Id. § 2000bb(b)(2).
205. 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (holding that regulations forcing inmates to work
on certain days did not violate prisoner's religious freedom even though the
regulations caused them to miss their weekly Muslim congregational service). Prison
regulations alleged to infringe upon constitutional rights are judged under a less
restrictive "reasonableness" standard. See id. at 349.
206. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 11-12, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1901
(citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), which upheld a military
regulation prohibiting a Jewish Air Force officer from wearing a yarmulke while on
duty and stating that RFRA will not alter pre-Smith decisions that used the
compelling interest test for military regulations that burdened religious practices).
207. See, e.g., Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying RFRA to
a prisoner's claims of First Amendment violations but concluding that the plaintiffs
claim failed nevertheless); Harris v. Lord, 957 F. Supp. 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that RFRA applied to, and supported, a prisoner's free exercise claims);
Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that RFRA
was intended to replace the looser "reasonableness" standard of OLone); Allah v.
Menei, 844 F. Supp. 1056, 1062 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that RFRA is the
appropriate standard for prisoners' free exercise claims).
208. See, e.g., Diaz, 114 F.3d at 73; Estep v. Dent, 914 F. Supp. 1462, 1467 (W.D.
Ky. 1996) (holding that, under RFRA, the prison administration would be violating a
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The City of Boerne argued before the Supreme Court that:
(1) the broad congressional remedial power of Morgan only
applied to equal protection rights; and (2) that Morgan marked
the "upper limit" for Section Five.2' In other words, the city
asserted, Morgan appropriately expanded Congress's remedial
power because Morgan applied to racial discrimination in the
election process, which was directly connected to the guaranteed
right of equal protection. 211 The city argued that the congressional
findings of fact at issue in Morgan were absent in RFRACongress did not demonstrate that state governments were
readily injuring the religious practices of specific groups.2 1' The
city urged that RFRA went beyond equal protection to "redefine
the meaning of an entire clause of the Constitution. 1 2
In Flores, the Court placed a ceiling on Congress's Section
Five power and established a test for distinguishing
congressional measures that are truly remedial from those that
are substantive and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Court,
however, stated that Congress must have wide discretion in
determining the line between remedial and substantive
measures.213 Thus, under the rule in Flores, the Court would still
defer to Congress for factual findings as it had done in the past. "'
Yet, as Justice Harlan discussed in Morgan, Congress's superior
fact-finding abilities did not constitute a power to define the
substantive scope of constitutional rights.21' Flores gave Congress
and the Court a framework that will determine the extent to
which Congress may remedy state violations of substantive
rights in the future:
There must be a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection,
Jewish prisoner's free exercise right by cutting his earlocks).
209. See Arguments Before the Court,supra note 189, at 3578.
210. See id.
211.

See id.

212. Id.
213. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997) (indicating that
while that line is difficult to discern, it exists and must be observed).
2141 See id. (giving Congress "wide latitude" to use this fact-finding ability to
determine the line of demarcation between measures that are remedial and
substantive); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (recognizing
that Congress should "assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations" at
issue and that the judiciary should not "review the congressional resolution of these
factors"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966) (describing
Congress's factual findings that several states were discriminating in their voting
processes).
215. Refer to notes 167-73 supra and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Harlan's dissent in Morgan).
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legislation may become substantive in operation and
effect. History and our case law support drawing the
distinction, one apparent from the text of the
Amendment." '
The Court did not overturn Morgan-it only clarified the
ambiguity that Morgan produced. It emphasized that the
enforcement clause gives Congress a remedial, not a substantive,
power.21 ' In essence, the Court adopted the rationale of Justice
Harlan's dissent in Morgan. ' It also limited Morgan to cases
involving racial discrimination and the Voting Rights Act." '
The Court
declared that it
must consider the
"appropriateness of remedial measures" implemented by
2 ' In effect, the Court in
Congress in light of the evil presented."
Flores established a rational basis test for measuring Congress's
use of its remedial power."' To satisfy the test, the legitimate
objective of Congress must be rationally related to the means it
uses to remedy an established injury.' To be rationally related,
there must be "congruence and proportionality" between the
remedial means adopted and the injury.2 3 If the measure fails
this test, then it will be construed as substantive and, therefore,
unconstitutional.2 4

216. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
217. See id. ("Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is."); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325-26 (describing
Congress's power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment as a remedial power).
218. Refer to notes 167-73 supra and accompanying text.
219. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 ("[Interpreting Morgan to give Congress the
power to interpret the Constitution 'would require an enormous extension of that
decision's rationale.'" (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970) (Stewart,
220. See id. at 2169.
221.
See id. at 2164. The purpose of a legislative action should be "legitimate...
[and] within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
222. See Donovan, supra note 152, at 457 (noting that even though McCulloch v.
Maryland established the extent of congressional power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, it also has been applied to establish the proper limits of all
congressional powers); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the rational basis test is a reflection of "our
respect for the institutional competence of the Congress... and our appreciation
of... Congress's political accountability").
223. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164 (noting that legislation that lacks a
connection between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means used to
achieve that remedy may become "substantive in operation and effect," placing the
legislation beyond the scope of Congress's § 5 enforcement power).
224. See id.
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2. The Significance of Flores for Separation of Powers and
Federalism. Flores is to the judicial branch what !IVS v.
Chadha is to the executive branch-in both cases, the Court
limited Congress's attempts to expand its powers." In Flores, the
Court reasserted its power of judicial review,' which it first
established in Marbury v. Madison: "[iut is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."' The Court restated that it is the final interpreter of the
Constitution, and that its judicial authority derives from the
premise that "the 'powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten,
the constitution is written.'"' Many of the original framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment feared giving Congress too much power
because it would "intrude into traditional areas of state
responsibility " "° and "place power in the hands of changing
congressional majorities.""1 Agreeing with the framers, the Court
expressed its concern in relying too heavily on those "shifting
legislative majorities. " 2 Congress may change the Constitution
with "legislative acts... alterable when the legislature shall
please to alter it,"' which would "circumvent the difficult and
detailed amendment process contained in Article V."' The Court
has emphasized the importance of its role in society as the
protector of minorities whose rights may not be as audible in a
Congress that represents the majority.'

225. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
226. See id at 944-59 (holding that a one-house legislative veto was
unconstitutional because it violated presidential veto power, as well as the bicameral
requirement of Article I, §§ 1 and 7).
227. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162 (discussing the basis of its judicial authority).
228. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
229. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176).
230. Id. at 2164.
231. Id. at 2165.
232. See id. at 2168 (warning that "[i]f Congress could define its own powers by
altering the Fourteenth Amendments meaning, no longer would the Constitution be
'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means" (quoting Marbury, 5
U.S. at 177)).
233. Id. (quoting Marbury,5 U.S. at 177).
234. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. V (outlining the procedure by which Congress
can propose amendments to the Constitution and the state legislatures can ratify
those proposed amendments).
235. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(declaring that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
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Clearly, the majority in Flores took hold of the principles in
Marburyns to fight Congress's attempt to circumvent the
judiciary.2 37 According to the Court, Congress's attempt to alter
its powers by interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment would
eliminate the effect of the Constitution as the 'superior,
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means."'238 RFRA was
not just a congressional attempt to instruct the Court on how to
interpret the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution-RFRA
directed "the legal effect courts are to give to any party's free
exercise claim--directing the court to give it the legal effect
appropriate in Congress' view .....239
In Flores, the Court also took a stand for federalism. It
criticized the "[siweeping coverage" of RFRA as an "intrusion at
every level of government."2 41 RFRA would heavily burden the
states with litigation and would diminish their traditional power
to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens.24'
In Flores, the Court attempted to define the role of Congress
with respect to the judiciary.242 First, the Court should defer to
236. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-77 (stating that "[tihe powers of the legislature
are defined, and limited" by the Constitution and that "the constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it").
237. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (arguing that allowing Congress to define its
own powers "by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning" would result in
unlimited congressional power).
238. Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
239. William W. Van Alstyne, The Failureof the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act Under Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 309 (1996). Cf.
McConnell, supra note 85, at 156, 171 (maintaining that RFRA "was a legitimate
exercise of Congress's power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment" because, under a straightforward reading of Marbury, Congress has
interpretative authority).
240. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. RFRA applies to all branches of federal, state,
and local government. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(1), 2000bb-3(a) (1994).
241. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171 (noting that the "substantial costs RFRA
exacts.., far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the
Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith"). But see In re Young, 141 F.3d 854,
856 (8th Cir.) (concluding that RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal law), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998).
242. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172. The Framers of the Constitution created coequal branches of government with different responsibilities: "The Legislature would
be possessed of power to 'prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights of every
citizen are to be regulated,' but the power of '[tihe interpretation of the laws' would
be 'the proper and peculiar province of the courts." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211, 222 (1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)
(alterations in original)). The relationship between the legislature and historical
branches has always been difficult. See Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying
Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 7, 8-9
(Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (stating that friction between the judicial and
congressional branches is inherent in the U.S. system); Maeva Marcus & Emily
Field Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 1789-1800, in
JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY, supra, at 31, 31-33
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Congress as a superior fact-finder and allow it to "'determin[e]
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'"' Then, the courts should use
the power, described in Marbury as interpreter of the
Constitution, "to determine if Congress has exceeded its
authority under the Constitution."2 "
3. The Significance of Flores for Free Exercise of Religion.
By declaring RFRA to be unconstitutional, the Court left Smith
as the framework within which courts should analyze free
exercise cases. By reviving Smith, however, the Court also
revived the debate on the best way to protect free exercise. Is the
majority's position that neutral laws of general applicability, not
targeted toward burdening religious practices, are constitutional
and the best protection for free exercise? Or, is Justice
O'Connor's assertion, that the stricter Sherbert test would better
protect free exercise from generally applicable laws while still
allowing states to enact laws necessary for their interests, more
accurate? In Flores,Justice O'Connor asked for a re-examination
of the holding in Smith and reiterated some ideas first expressed
in her concurrence therein. 5 She urged implementing Sherbert's
balancing test, which requires the state to "justify any
substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a
compelling state interest and to impose that burden only by
means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." ' She also
concurred with the majority's conclusions concerning the proper
limits of congressional remedial power, but disagreed with its
elimination of the Sherbert test because eliminating it would be
inconsistent with judicial precedent and would harm religious
liberty.' In fact, cases decided after Flores attest to Justice

(providing a short history of the difficult relationship between the judicial and
legislative branches).
243. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
651 (1966)) (alteration in original).
24Id Interestingly, the Court has also stated that "[wihen Congress acts
within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty
to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution."
Id. at 2171; see also United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1562
(11th Cir. 1984) (noting that "the power of Congress to go beyond the explicit
provisions of the Constitution and to take steps that the courts are reluctant to take"
is basic to the U.S. governmental system).
245. See F/ores, 117 S. Ct. at 2178 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (declaring that
"Smith is gravely at odds with our earlier free exercise precendents").
246. 1& (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 2176-77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The Court's rejection of this
principle in Smith is supported neither by precedent nor.., by history. The decision
has harmed religious liberty.").
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O'Connor's concern, especially in the area of prison
administration.2 48
Flores may also impact a creditor's ability to obtain tithes to
religious institutions from debtors. After Flores, debtors
contributing tithes to their churches as part of their religious
duties to the church will no longer be able to claim RFRA as a
defense against creditors.2 49 Although in Flores the Court
concluded that RFRA is not applicable to state governments, it
was not clear as to whether RFRA was unconstitutional as
applied to federal law."o RFRA's protection against federal
interference may be independent from its protection against state
interference. 1 If the Court found RFRA to be constitutional at
the federal level, then RFRA could be incorporated into
bankruptcy law. 2 The Court does not seem ready to address the
248. See, e.g., Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that
Boerne restored the "reasonableness" standard of Turner v. Safley, which granted
deference to prison administration in free exercise cases); Washington v. Garcia, 977
F. Supp. 1067, 1070-71 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the proper standard for
evaluating free exercise cases is the pre-RFRA, reasonableness standard, as
articulated in O'Lone).
249. See generally Cindy Horswell, Creditors Tell Tithers: Render Debts Unto
Us, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1997, at Al (discussing concerns from Texas religious
groups in the aftermath of Flores);see also In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that, under RFRA, a bankruptcy debtor's religious tithes could not be
recovered from the church as an avoidable transaction in an adversary proceeding),
vacated, Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997)
(mem.) (remanding the case to the Eighth Circuit for further consideration in light of
Flores),cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998).
250. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir.) (stating that because the
Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states, and not to the federal
government, Flores did not decide the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal
law), cert. denied sub nom. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 119 S. Ct.
43 (1998); Aurora R. Bearse, Note, RFRA. Is It Necessary? Is It Proper?,50 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1045, 1056 (1998) (recounting the Justice Department's efforts to preserve
RFRA claims at the federal level and emphasizing that Flores did not address
RFRA's applicability to the federal government).
251. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 859 (concluding that if RFRA is constitutional
as applied to federal law, then the portion applicable to the federal government is
fully severable from the portion that applies to the states). For a discussion of the
recent Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, see Polly Ross Hughes, State
Senate Gives Overwhelming Approval to Religious Freedom Bill, Hous. CHRON.,
Mar. 16, 1999, at A15.
252. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 860-61 (concluding that Article I of the
Constitution, which allows Congress to enact RFRA, would modify U.S. bankruptcy
laws so that a recovery that "places a substantial burden on a debtor's exercise of
religion will not be allowed unless it is the least restrictive means to satisfy a
compelling governmental interest"); see also In re Saunders, 214 B.R. 524, 526-27
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (concluding that pre-RFRA case law does not support
allowing debtors, on the basis of their religion, "to prefer their divine creditor[s] over
their earthly ones") (quoting Note, Tithing in Chapter 13-A Divine Creditor
Exception to Section 1325?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1141 (1997)); cf. In re Young,
141 F.3d at 863 (Bogue, J., dissenting) (arguing that RFRA is unconstitutional and
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issue of RFRA's constitutionality at the federal level, however,
declining to grant certiorari in In re Young, a case in which the
Eighth Circuit held that RFRA was constitutional as applied to
the federal government.'
IV. CONCLUSION

Although Flores raises concerns about the future of free
exercise cases, it also defines the scope of congressional
enforcement power as one that is remedial in nature and
establishes a "proportionality and congruence test" by which to
measure that remedial power.' Judicial history demonstrates
that such clarification was long over due.' Unfortunately, free
exercise was the victim of the Court's past inability to clearly
define the boundaries of congressional enforcement power. Yet,
by leaving Smith as the controlling law on free exercise, the
Court has left room for future free exercise cases to challenge the
discrepancies in Smith, especially in light of Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, which greatly undermines the majority's reasoning
and demonstrates that disturbance of Sherbert was
unnecessary."6 Flores, as the extension of Smith, clearly
illustrates that the law on free exercise "remains marked by an
'intolerable tension.'" "
Elizabeth L Trujillo

that "there is a point beyond which Congress may not go in the exercise of its power
without intruding upon the core function of the judicial branch, thereby offending
'vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers' (quoting City of Boerne
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997))).
253. See Christians,119 S. Ct. at 43 (denying certiorari to In re Young).
254. Refer to notes 58-59, 216-18 supra and accompanying text.
255. Refer to Part M.B-C supra (discussing the judicial history of defining
congressional enforcement power).
256. Refer Part IHA2 supra (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in

Smith).
257. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
574 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).

